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Abstract: Our study analyses the extent of integration of the EU market for life and non-life 
insurance. The main integration indicator used is the market share (premium based) of foreign 
companies in domestic markets. For the calculation of this indicator, three different kinds of 
foreign presence are taken into account: foreign presence through merger and acquisitions, 
through branches and agencies and direct cross-border sales without physical presence. 
Whereas the static view reveals a high degree of national fragmentation the dynamic view 
indicates advancing integration. The results also show that integration is even less advanced 
for life than for non-life insurance and that mergers and acquisitions are the dominant strategy 
to access a foreign market. Besides summarising the liberalisation history of the European 
insurance sector and discussing consumer benefits from further integration, the study 
contributes to a better understanding of obstacles to insurance market integration. 
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"Evidence of a growth in cross-border trade in insurance is mixed - possibly due to an acute 
scarcity of data." (OECD, Financial Market Trends No. 75, 2000) 
1. Introduction 
There is overwhelming agreement among market observers that the European insurance 
industry has made a ground-breaking step towards a single insurance market by the 
implementation of the Life and Non-Life Third Insurance Directives on 1 July 1994. Among 
the EU countries since then legal barriers to cross-border insurance business have been 
minimised. 
Conducting insurance business in a unified European market offers advantages to both market 
sides compared to a situation of national fragmentation. Suppliers benefit from improved 
regional diversification of insured risks, the realisation of economies of scale and a wider area 
for investing assets. Consumers benefit from a larger choice among insurance companies and 
products and a higher degree of competition. Provided that antitrust policy is effectively 
safeguarding a competitive situation policyholders should therefore get a better ratio of 
“insurance value for premium”. 
But also the EU economy as a whole should benefit from insurance market integration given 
the increasing weight of insurance services for growth and employment. Some data in figure 1 
point to this increasing weight. 
Figure 1: EU-15 life and non-life premiums and life insurance share 1991-1999 
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into US dollar (average exchange rates for the reference year); ** Life insurance share is defined as the share 
of life insurance premiums with respect to the whole insurance market premiums. 
Taken together, life and non-life business in the EU-15 countries account for a total premium 
income - serving as the major indicator - of 769.2 billion US $ in 1999 indicating a 8.2% 
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share of EU-15 GDP. In 1990 this share amounted to merely 5.8%.1 This enormous increase 
has been unevenly distributed among life and non-life business. While the share of non-life 
premiums to GDP increased from 3.0% to 3.2% the correspondent life insurance share 
underwent a boom almost doubling the share from 2.8% in 1990 to 5.0%. Consequently, the 
share of life insurance with respect to the whole insurance market (life insurance share) 
surpassed 50% for the first time in 1997 resulting in 59.0% in 1999. Non-life business has 
been almost stagnant partly due to the massive competition in a saturated market while life 
volumes benefited mainly from their increasingly important role in private pension schemes.2 
Further general information on the EU-15 insurance market is given in figure 2 in terms of 
national market shares for the life and non-life market segments. 
Figure 2: EU-15 insurance market shares in 1999 
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Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook (2001), own calculations. 
However, these data on market size and structure do not provide much insight into the degree 
of market integration. More than seven years after the Third Insurance Directive and three 
years after the introduction of the Euro the reality of European insurance is still far away from 
representing a highly integrated market. The cases that consumers from EU countries shop 
around and chose the best insurance contracts based on a pan-European comparison still are 
extremely rare. Volumes of direct cross-border business is still low – even in the internet age. 
While integration is undoubtedly high on reinsurance markets and the market for industrial 
risks, the same does not hold for retail insurance markets. With this background this study 
                                                 
1 Most figures that are comparable between countries are on a US $ basis since the main data pool, OECD’s 
Insurance Statistics Yearbook, employs this standardisation, too. Furthermore, life and non-life business is 
categorised in accordance with normal EU and OECD conventions; that means accident and health insurance 
are classified as non-life business. 
2 See Swiss Re (2000c). 
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tries to contribute to a better understanding of the present degree of and the remaining 
obstacles to integration. 
After reporting on main provisions of the EU regulatory framework for cross-border business 
(section 2) the second step of the analysis places emphasis on openness as a possible indicator 
for measuring integration (section 3). It is shown that M&A activity has indeed led to stronger 
cross-border ties in the insurance sector judging from foreign controlled market shares. In 
contrast to that, business through office branches and direct cross-border insurance business is 
still marginal, though not declining. In a third step (section 4) those policy induced and 
natural obstacles are discussed that are particularly relevant for the European insurance 
market. Here, taxation and regulation issues on the supply side and consumer confidence on 
the demand side are at a prominent place. Section 5 concludes and briefly refers to possible 
effects of e-commerce on insurance market integration. 
2. Building up the Internal Market for insurance 
In general, the single market for financial services is founded on the fulfilment of the three 
indispensable basic freedoms provided by the Treaty of Rome (1957): the freedom of 
establishment, the free movement of goods and services and the free movement of capital. 
With respect to insurance, three generations of insurance directives have been issued between 
1973 and 1992 (figure 3) to enforce these principles.3,4 
In the first stage (1973-79) the freedom of establishment was realised. Insurance companies 
were allowed to open up subsidiaries, branch offices or agencies in every EU Member State. 
Though, the national authority of the host country was held responsible for prudential 
supervision (host country control).5 During the second stage (1983-90) the freedom of 
services was set up. Since then it was possible to do insurance business without having a fixed 
branch or subsidiary. The host country control, however, was abolished only for certain 
industrial risks (e.g. industrial fire) while for private business most EU member nations made 
use of their option to leave the host country control unchanged; exceptions to this rule were 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. One benevolent explanation for this may be found 
in the authorities attempt to maximise the protection of the private policyholder. But also 
protectionist motivations most likely played a role for sticking to host country control. This 
regulatory regime left the domestic insurance industry being in the more comfortable situation 
not to operate in a contestable international market environment. 
                                                 
3 In this study no special focus is being laid on the reinsurance business that already  has been liberalised in 
1964, including the freedom of services principle. Like MAT insurance (Marine, Aviation and Transport) this 
segment is in general a widely internationalised business. 
4 See Swiss Re (1996) and Swiss Re (2000a). 
5 According to a market participant that answered our questionnaire (see box on page 19) the seventies marked 
the first of three phases by the setting up of branches. 
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Figure 3: Important EU Insurance Directives 
 1970... 1980... 1990... 2000... 
First motor insurance 
Directive     
First non-life insurance 
Directive        
First life assurance 
Directive            
Second motor 
insurance Directive                   
Second non-life 
insurance Directive                      
Second life assurance 
Directive                        
Third non-life 
insurance Directive                         
Third life assurance 
Directive                         
 
 Period of implementation (from date of publication 
until date of entry into force) 
    
 Community law 
 
The third generation of insurance directives (1992) was thought to unfold the desired quantum 
leap for wholly liberalising the retail business, too. It consisted of the subsequent key 
elements: 
- abolition of price and product regulations, 
- restriction of host country supervision to solvency control,6 
- establishment of the principle of minimum harmonisation, 
- introduction of a single EU licence (+ mutual recognition) and 
- home country control for all insurance classes. 
The most important step was the establishment of the home country control principle since 
market observers held the opinion that foreign suppliers were reluctant to establish a branch 
office under the control of the host country. Since then, companies only need a licence from 
their home country supervisory authority to conduct insurance business all over the EU, either 
under the rule of freedom of establishment or under the rule of freedom to provide services. 
However, the business of subsidiaries remains regulated by the host country. Additionally, the 
                                                 
6 The first two elements apply only to those countries where such systems still existed, e.g. Germany and Italy. 
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competent home authority of their head office country has to be notified of their intended 
business scheme. Documents indicating the member country in which the branch is to be 
established, the name and address of the agent or branch and a scheme of operations have to 
be submitted. With respect to the provisions on the freedom of services it is simply required 
that the competent home authority is being informed about the member country in which they 
intend to carry on business and about the risks they intend to cover. The respective home 
country authorities pay attention to the exchange of information between the supervisory 
authorities. 
These efforts for liberalisation and deregulation led market observers to expect a 
strengthening of European cross-border competition and market consolidation. Yet, the ideal 
of a single insurance market by far has not been achieved during the time thereafter. Insurance 
enterprises now have to cope with both newly emerged and well known obstacles. Many 
uncertainties have arisen from the exact scope of the freedom to provide services and from the 
extent to which the general good principle can be invoked by national authorities. The latter 
principle has been developed by case law. It enables national authorities even now to set 
individual national rules that possibly deny market access to foreign companies if certain 
public interests are claimed to be violated. This claim can be based on consumer protection, 
prevention of fraud or worker protection, for example. The Commissions’ communication on 
“Freedom to Provide Services and the General Good in the Insurance Sector” - announced to 
be published in 1997, but indeed issued only three years later – should clarify its view of the 
freedom to provide services and the general good principle. However, since the general good 
principle is being evolved by case law legal doubts persist and hinder insurance companies to 
approach foreign EU markets without frictions.7 
3. An evaluation of the present degree of integration 
3.1 Method and data 
Two main problems arise in the assessment of the degree of EU insurance market integration. 
First, very different indicators are conceivable and partly may lead to contradicting results. 
Second, the data base is small and incomplete and does not allow to draw a detailed picture of 
cross-border activities in the EU insurance industry. 
Important indicators to assess market integration are: 
(a) The degree of openness based on an import view and measured as the foreign companies 
market share in the domestic market, i.e. premiums written in the home country by host 
insurers. 
(b) The magnitude of the home country bias in the asset structure of insurance companies. 
(c) The convergence of product prices, product types and market indicators (i.e. life insurance 
shares, premiums/GDP, companies’ efficiency and concentration). 
                                                 
7 A more detailed overview about relevant obstacles is given in section 4. 
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(d) The size of the reinsurance share: a higher share indicates lower integration (i.e. the small 
diversification of insured risks results in a stronger shifting of risks to reinsurers). 
The convergence in the design and the pricing of insurance products would best qualify to 
derive implications for the final customer. Unfortunately, these figures are not available. This 
analysis rather focuses on the first indicator, the openness of EU/EEA countries. If prudently 
considered the level and the dynamics of the degree of openness provide a measure for the 
contestability of a national market: The higher the share of foreign companies acting on a 
national market the better is the choice of products and companies for the final consumer. 
For both the life and non-life sector market shares of foreign companies in total domestic 
business are described. Three basic categories are applied for foreign companies holding 
shares in the domestic market: 
- market shares of foreign controlled undertakings, 
- market shares of branches and agencies of foreign undertakings, and 
- market shares of direct cross-border insurance business without a permanent physical 
presence. 
Unfortunately, these data are only partly available. If possible, the foreign companies market 
share is subdivided in EU/EEA and non EU/EEA participation.8 We forego analysing 
strategic alliances and co-operations as yet another type of penetrating a foreign market since 
quantifying this issue is hardly possible. 
The main data source is the OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook 2001 that contains data for 
the period 1992-1999. This yearly updated OECD publication is an extensive pool of 
insurance data covering major market indicators, obtained from the governments of the 
OECD members. A significant effort has been made to achieve comparability among OECD 
countries; definitions, classifications, calculation methods and units have been standardised as 
far as possible.9 The OECD data set is partly augmented by information of national and 
European insurance federations and by research data of Swiss Re. 
Some caveats have to be taken into consideration. First, concerning the dynamics of 
integration an increase in cross-border operations may also be an indicator of heterogeneous 
tax, regulatory and supervisory structures. For example, motivated by tax avoidance 
strategies, insurers set up business in “tax havens” like Ireland or Luxembourg. Second, with 
regard to cross-section comparisons, small countries ceteris paribus possess a higher degree of 
openness if activities are related to their size. This objection is mitigated by executing the 
relevant scatter plots. Third, if assessments are made with respect to the impact of the EU 
Third Insurance Directives one has to take into account that certain markets like UK, 
Netherlands, Ireland and France already prior to 1994 have been subject to a less regulated 
                                                 
8 Some analysis includes Norway as an EEA country since the same EU rules for insurance business are applied 
in EEA countries. 
9 For further methodological information, see OECD (2001a, pp. 255ff.) 
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market.10 
3.2 Non-life insurance 
The structure of the analysis corresponds to the main options available for entering a foreign 
market: 1. merger & acquisitions and 2. establishment of branches and agencies. In a third 
step the combined shares of 1. and 2. are computed and analysed adding further information 
to the degree of openness. 
Foreign controlled companies 
As a starting point (OECD, 2001a, p. 42f) data on market shares of foreign companies in the 
markets of OECD member countries is employed. Yet, the raw data have to be treated with 
caution due to a structural break. As a consequence of the regulatory changes introduced 
through the Third Insurance Directives, since 1995 data of EU/EEA countries do not include 
data on branches and agencies of foreign companies whose head offices are situated in other 
EU/EEA countries. Therefore, table 1 presents corrected data of the pure market share of 
foreign controlled undertakings in total domestic business.11 For reasons of data availability 
and comparability we compute only a sample of nine EU/EEA countries. Thereby in 1999 
still 67% of the overall EU/EEA market in non-life insurance are covered. 
At first sight a very heterogeneous picture emerges. Market shares of foreign controlled 
companies differ widely both in the cross-section but also with respect to national trends. 
While Portugal, for instance, shows an almost continuous rise starting from the lowest level of 
5.1% in 1993 to 26.7% in 1999, Austria displays a very high but constant share of about 49%. 
Foreign companies in Spain and Luxembourg in contrast even lost ground. Also regarding the 
differentiation between big and small countries no clear-cut picture arises. In Germany the 
presupposed small share for a big country applies whereas in the UK as yet another big 
country the share of foreign controlled companies in 1999 was more than 20 percentage 
points higher than in Germany; this could be due to the fact that in the U.K. already prior to 
1994 regulation has not been so intense. Also the Netherlands and Luxembourg both 
representing small countries differ by 20 percentage points with the latter showing a relative 
small share of 13.9%. 
                                                 
10 See Swiss Re (1996). 
11 The definition of foreign controlled companies is specific to the countries individual arrangements. Though, 
most countries apply the standard measure: „foreign majority interests over 50 per cent“. For exact definitions 
and further notes by country, see OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook, 2001, pp. 259ff. 
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Table 1: Non-life insurance, foreign controlled companies in total domestic business (gross 
premium basis) in % 
Host Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Austria 47.9 49.1 47.4 49.2 49 50.7 48.7 
Denmark 30.5 18.7 30.4 29.1 26.9 28.4 42 
Germany 14.1 6.3 6.2 12.4 12 11.5 12.9 
Luxembourg N.A.2 N.A. N.A. 20.3 16.8 13.2 13.9 
Netherlands 20.1 18.4 19.2 18.4 34.1 34.3 33.7 
Norway 15.2 N.A. N.A. 17.5 18.2 20.1 18.3 
Portugal 5.1 5.5 14.7 14.2 14.3 25.7 26.7 
Spain 35 25.4 29.3 26.1 23.9 26.6 25.1 
Utd. Kingdom N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 29.9 29 34.5 
Average share1 19.6 12.9 13.6 17.4 22.2 22.3 24.7 
Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook (2001), own calculations by subtracting the numbers of OECD’s 
table IX.2.2 from the numbers of table IX.2.1. 1weighted by the resp. market share. 2N.A.=Not Available 
Despite these ambiguous view of each singular country it can clearly be stated that on average 
the involvement of insurance companies from abroad has risen noticeably from 19.6% in 
1993 to 24.7% in 1999. The slump to 12.9% in 1994 - mainly explained by the high weight of 
Germany where the share declined sharply to 6.3% - does not invalidate this conclusion. 
These increasing foreign linkages in the European insurance industry result from the merger 
& acquisition dynamics of the nineties. The rise in cross-border mergers is rather a bit 
surprising since M&A activities predominantly have been executed on a national scale.12 
Although the OECD data basis does not make a distinction between “European” and “non-
European” market shares one has to assume that most part of that shares indeed are domiciled 
in the EU/EEA. 
EU/EEA branches and agencies 
The second step of the analysis broadens the picture of foreign companies market share. 
Import data of European cross-border activities on a branches and agencies basis is calculated. 
Since the OECD was aware of cross-border data shortcomings they installed a Working 
Group that together with Eurostat tries to improve the data base (OECD, 2001a, p. 259). As a 
result of this work, since 1997 the OECD provides numbers for direct gross premiums earned 
by EU/EEA insurers through branches and agencies abroad. An import-export matrix 
measured in the respective local currencies of each exporting home country is presented by 
the OECD for the life and the non-life business. This matrix, though, has to be standardised 
on a US $ basis in order to extract import values and import quotas. Table 2 displays the 
resulting absolute values and shares of non-life premiums that have been written by EU/EEA 
insurers through branches and agencies in 16 EU/EEA countries for 1997–99. 
                                                 
12 This point all the more applies to the banking industry where cross-border mergers so far are more seldom. 
See Group of Ten (2001) and Eppendorfer, Beckmann and Neimke (2002). 
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Table 2: Non-life insurance, business written through foreign EU/EEA branches/agencies in 
EU/EEA countries 
 1997 1998 1999 
 
Host Country 
$ value of 
imports 
(million) 
import 
share1 
$ value of 
imports 
(million) 
import 
share1 
$ value of 
imports 
(million) 
import 
share1 
Austria 47.61 0.56 51.78 0.63 49.07 0.61 
Belgium 208.74 2.74 180.45 2.39 186.52 2.46 
Denmark 101.63 2.14 142.29 2.68 295.75 5.88 
Finland 7.90 0.32 10.07 0.38 14.37 0.56 
France 452.17 0.94 551.41 1.14 537.80 1.13 
Germany 295.01 0.3 318.31 0.29 293.87 0.27 
Greece 37.17 5.38 42.92 3.81 50.45 4.11 
Ireland 56.59 1.75 68.56 1.88 76.21 1.76 
Italy 228.54 0.8 284.38 0.94 315.86 1.02 
Luxembourg2 29.31 6.33 56.11 7.44 63.92 8.43 
Netherlands 205.29 1.39 185.01 1.15 193.61 9.6 
Norway 56.48 1.54 52.08 1.41 857.16 21.95 
Portugal 141.93 5.15 118.53 3.96 106.74 3.52 
Spain 318.61 2.07 268.90 1.68 183.86 1.08 
Sweden 83.86 1.37 95.86 1.7 102.39 1.52 
Utd. Kingdom 1569.15 2.44 1360.73 2.01 1400.45 2.09 
Total 
EU15/EEA 
3839.98 
 
1.183 
 
3787.40 
(-1.4%)4 
1.153 
 
4728.04 
(+24.8%)4 
1.433 
 
Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook (2001), own calculations. 1Import share is measured in % as the 
computed absolute $ value of imports to total gross non-life premiums written in the respective countries. 
2Exports of Luxembourg are not available. 3Ratio of total EU15/EEA import value to total EU15/EEA 
premiums written. 4Year-on-year growth rate. 
Again, cross-country patterns are not homogeneous ranging in 1998, for example, from 0.29% 
in Germany to 7.44% in Luxembourg. The shares of business written through foreign 
EU/EEA branches and agencies tend to be higher in smaller countries like Denmark, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Portugal. On the whole, it stands out that on average (see the last row of table 2) 
only a small share of slightly above 1% of total EU/EEA non-life insurance business is 
conducted by foreign EU/EEA branches and agencies. Comparing table 1 and table 2, as a 
first result it emerges that the strategy of foreign companies to overtake domestic companies 
or to acquire majority stakes is obviously dominant in spite of the relaxation of host country 
control. Table 2 as well indicates, however, that the share of branches and agencies grows, 
too. Contrary to the generally stagnant non-life market (figure 1) the business through 
EU/EEA branches and agencies increase by 12% per year on average (1997-1999). 
Total foreign presence 
 
The third step regards total foreign presence. For that purpose, the sum of three components is 
calculated: the market shares of foreign controlled companies, EU/EEA branches and 
agencies and non-EU/EEA branches and agencies. Results for 1997 and 1999 are presented in 
table 3. 
 10 
Table 3: Non-life insurance, overview of total foreign presence (in % of total domestic business) 
1997 1999 
Branches and 
Agencies 
Branches and 
Agencies 
 
 
 
 
Host Country 
Foreign 
contr. 
EU/ 
EEA 
Non-
EU/ 
EEA 
Sum of 
columns 
2-4 
Foreign 
contr. 
EU/ 
EEA 
Non-
EU/ 
EEA 
Sum of 
columns 
6-8 
Austria 48.99 0.56 5.00 54.55 48.67 0.61 6.41 55.69 
Denmark 26.91 2.14 1.73 30.78 41.99 5.88 1.62 49.49 
Germany 12.04 0.3 0.66 13 12.93 0.27 0.67 13.87 
Luxembourg 16.8 6.33 14.94 38.07 13.93 8.43 10.01 32.37 
Netherlands 34.13 1.39 2.50 38.02 33.69 9.6 2.12 45.41 
Norway 18.18 1.54 2.84 22.56 18.25 21.95 2.82 43.02 
Portugal 14.29 5.15 0.74 20.18 26.66 3.52 0.05 30.23 
Spain 23.91 2.07 3.38 29.36 25.12 1.08 0.06 26.26 
Utd. Kingdom 29.94 2.44 7.40 39.78 34.52 2.09 9.93 46.54 
Avrg. share1 22.18 1.35 3.36 26.88 24.74 2.41 3.90 31.04 
Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook, 2001, own calculations. 1weighted by the resp. market shares. 
The numbers in the fourth and eighth column of table 3 show market shares of 
branches/agencies of non-EU/EEA undertakings in domestic business that have not been 
mentioned above. They add information on international openness in general. 
In contrast to the pure growth figures of the non-life sector (figure 1) it should be stressed that 
in no way a stagnancy with respect to integration dynamics is reported. Judging on basis of 
country averages (last row of table 3) foreign companies market share climbed from 26,9% in 
1997 to 31% in 1999. This relatively high share has to be interpreted even as a lower limit 
since OECD data do not contain direct cross-border transactions without having a physical 
presence. Through other sources it is reported, though, that direct cross-border business 
remains marginal representing a 1.9% share of non-life business in 1999.13 
To complete the descriptive analysis of non-life insurance in the EU/EEA area it is shown in 
figure 4 that countries coming up with a greater market size - measured in premiums written - 
tend to be less open to foreign companies. Beyond this expected finding it is interesting to 
observe that countries like the Netherlands or UK that already prior to the 1992 Third 
Insurance Directives abstained from controlling insurance policy terms, premiums and tariffs 
illustrate a relatively higher degree of openness. On the other hand, Germany representing a 
country with formerly strong control with respect to the so-called material supervision has a 
rather low share of foreign companies acting within its borders even though considering its 
size.14 
                                                 
13 See Swiss Re (2000c). 
14 See Vollbrecht (2001) for details concerning the differing history of supervision in EU countries. 
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of market size vs. total foreign presence (non-life) 
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a) 
Source: OECD (2001a), own calculations; a) computed linear regression line. 
3.3 Life insurance 
Turning to the prospering European life insurance industry the analysis (tables 4-6) runs 
analogously to that presented above for the non-life sector. 
Foreign controlled companies 
Also for life insurance there is no uniform pattern across the 9 EU/EEA countries referred to. 
While Spain, Portugal and Austria point to a decline of foreign controlled companies in total 
domestic business the Netherlands, Denmark, UK and Germany move towards the opposite 
direction. Furthermore, massive particular shifts are remarkable: The share of foreign 
controlled companies increases for example in Denmark from 5.9% in 1998 to 17.6% in 1999 
while decreasing in Portugal from 23.5% in 1994 to 9.9% in 1995. It is reasonable, though, 
not to place too much emphasis on the partially volatile national figures since they can easily 
be provoked by singular merger & acquisition transactions and thus partly offsetting each 
other. To get an overall EU picture rather the average (last row of table 4) should be taken 
into consideration. While in 1993 11.7% of total gross life insurance premiums - for data 
available - have been written by foreign controlled insurance companies this share decidedly 
increased to 20.8% in 1999. 
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Table 4: Life insurance, foreign controlled companies in total domestic business (gross premium 
basis) in % 
Host Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Austria 33.3 37.44 34.62 34.36 35.03 32.49 30.28 
Denmark 5.95 7.99 6.96 7.00 6.48 5.92 17.61 
Germany 8.33 7.15 7.05 6.38 6.48 5.5 15.07 
Luxembourg N.A.2 N.A. N.A. 89.42 80.14 80.38 63.14 
Netherlands 16.34 16.68 16.58 15.27 29.09 30.04 27.31 
Norway 1.77 N.A. 2.48 2.78 2.81 3.43 3.55 
Portugal 15.87 23.46 9.93 10.18 10.83 12.99 10.37 
Spain 21.62 12.32 23.02 17.62 16.78 27.78 15.00 
Utd. Kingdom N.A. N.A. N.A. 18.44 17.43 21.5 22.01 
Average share1 11.7 10.8 11.4 14.0 16.4 19.1 20.8 
Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook (2001), own calculations. 1weighted by the resp. market share; in 
1999 64% of the EU/EEA market is covered. 2N.A.=Not Available 
If life and non-life figures are compared similarities as well as important differences are 
striking. Interestingly, for an individual country e.g. Portugal, the change in the life segment 
did not appear related to the change in the non-life segment. With respect to non-life 
insurance the share of foreign controlled companies in Portugal rises gradually (table 1) but in 
the life insurance sector it shrinks on average. If instead the focus is on the group as a whole 
the direction and the speed of foreign companies participation in domestic EU/EEA countries 
on average is similar to the non-life sector. The major difference is that it runs on a 
significantly lower level. 
EU/EEA branches and agencies 
An important distinction has to be made with respect to the life insurance business that is 
written through EU/EEA branches and agencies (tables 5 and 2). On average only 0.18% 
(1997) resp. 0.22% (1999) of total premiums are written through EU/EEA branches and 
agencies. This means less than the sixth part compared to the non-life sector (1.18% in 1997 
vs. 1.43% in 1999. see table 2). Significant shares of business through established entities 
only come about in Luxembourg (2.51%). Portugal (3.16) and Sweden (3.8%) for the year 
1999. 
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Table 5: Life insurance. business written through foreign EU/EEA branches/agencies in 
EU/EEA countries 
 1997 1998 1999 
Host country $ value of 
imports 
(million) 
import 
share1  
$ value of 
imports 
(million) 
import 
share1  
$ value of 
imports 
(million) 
import 
share1  
Austria 4.62 0.11 8.76 0.19 35.46 0.69 
Belgium 0.51 0.01 0 0.00 1.14 0.01 
Denmark 0 0.00 6.26 0.82 9.27 0.13 
Finland 0.15 0.01 0 0.00 15.14 0.45 
France 2.37 0.003 26.74 0.04 31.78 0.04 
Germany 57.95 0.09 9.07 0.02 49.91 0.07 
Greece 3.11 0.04 3.31 0.23 0 0.00 
Ireland 0.03 0.001 1.54 0.02 1.35 0.01 
Italy 48.89 0.21 57.54 0.18 2.43 0.01 
Luxembourg2 20.49 0.47 25.74 0.54 127.61 2.51 
Netherlands 1.37 0.01 7.68 0.04 20.25 0.09 
Norway 3.54 0.10 12.80 0.36 23.59 0.70 
Portugal 294.73 2.75 289.04 9.62 123.28 3.16 
Spain 98.04 0.75 35.67 0.26 4.72 0.03 
Sweden 0 0.00 140.31 1.48 439.13 3.80 
Utd. Kingdom 92.59 0.09 115.72 0.09 86.55 0.06 
Total 
EU15/EEA 
628.38 0.184 740.19 
(+17.8%)4 
0.194 971.60 
(+31.3%)4 
0.224 
Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook (2001), own calculations. 1Import share is measured in % as the 
computed absolute $ value of imports to total gross non-life premiums written in the respective countries. 
2Exports of Luxembourg are not available. 3Ratio of total EU15/EEA import value to total EU15/EEA 
premiums written. 4Year-on-year growth rate. 
Total foreign presence 
The same tendency evolves from business through non-EU/EEA branches and agencies (table 
6, columns 4 and 8). Though on average it is significantly higher than the EU/EEA 
counterpart (2.53% in 1997 and 3.27% in 1999) it is lower than the corresponding non-life 
values (3.36% in 1997 and 3.90% in 1999). Also the fraction that is not directly covered 
through this analysis due to missing data, i.e. direct cross-border transactions without a 
physical presence, indicates much lower shares of life insurance (0.6%) compared to non-life 
insurance (1.9%) in 1999.15 Concentrating the entire information available into table 6, the 
“lower limit” of a 19.1% (1997) and a 24.2% (1999) stake in foreign participation in the 
domestic EU/EEA countries materialises. The respective figures for the non-life sector (table 
3) are 26.9% (1997) and 31.0% (1999). 
                                                 
15 See Swiss Re (2000c). 
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Table 6: Life insurance, overview of total foreign presence (in % of total domestic business) 
1997 1999 
Branches and 
Agencies 
Branches and 
Agencies 
 
 
 
 
Host Country 
Foreign 
control 
EU/ 
EEA 
Non-
EU/ 
EEA 
Sum of 
columns 
2-4 
Foreign 
control 
EU/ 
EEA 
Non-
EU/ 
EEA 
Sum of 
columns 
6-8 
Austria 35.03 0.11 0.00 35.14 30.28 0.69 0.00 30.97 
Denmark 6.48 0.00 0.40 6.88 17.61 0.13 0.31 18.05 
Germany 6.48 0.09 2.10 8.67 15.07 0.07 2.14 17.28 
Luxembourg 80.14 0.47 2.28 83.43 63.14 2.51 7.83 73.48 
Netherlands 29.09 0.01 5.14 34.24 27.31 0.09 4.77 32.17 
Norway 2.81 0.10 0.01 2.92 3.55 0.70 0.45 4.70 
Portugal 10.83 2.75 2.33 15.91 10.37 3.16 1.66 15.19 
Spain 16.78 0.75 3.63 21.16 15.00 0.03 0.75 15.78 
Utd. Kingdom 17.43 0.09 2.51 20.03 22.01 0.06 4.05 26.12 
Avrg. share1 16.40 0.16 2.53 19.07 20.75 0.17 3.27 24.19 
Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook, 2001, own calculations. 1weighted by the resp. market share. 
The country specific degree of openness derived in table 6 is slightly negatively correlated to 
the size of the corresponding markets as revealed in figure 5. This negative correlation is not 
as clear-cut as in the non-life sector presented above (figure 4). 
Figure 5: Scatter plot of market size vs. total foreign presence (life) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Life premiums 1999 in bn US $
To
ta
l f
or
ei
gn
 p
re
se
nc
e 
19
99
 in
 %
United Kingdom
Germany
Netherlands
Austria
Denmark
Spain
Portugal
Norway
a) 
 
Source: OECD (2001a), own calculations; a) computed linear regression line. 
But again, countries that already prior to 1992 had less severe regulations with respect to 
product and price control (UK and the Netherlands) prove to have a relatively high presence 
of foreign companies business within their borders. 
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3.4 Conclusions from descriptive analysis 
The main results emerging from the descriptive analysis are condensed in figure 6: 
• The involvement of foreign insurers in national EU/EEA markets runs mainly through 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
• Branches and agencies play only a minor part as an entry strategy. 
• The share of foreign controlled companies has risen significantly in the nineties, 
especially in the last three years.16 
• The share of non-EU/EEA branches is even higher than for EU/EEA branches. 
• The non-life sector generally is more open for all types of market entries analysed. 
• The relative difference of the non-life compared to the life sector concerning different 
entry strategies is highest for EU/EEA branches and agencies. 
Figure 6: Non-life and life insurance, foreign companies market share 1997 and 1999 in % 
20.824.716.422.2
0.2
2.4
0.2
1.4
3.3
3.9
2.5
3.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Fo
re
ig
n 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 in
 %
Branches/Agencies
Non-EU/EEA
Branches/Agencies
EU/EEA
Foreign controlled
companies
 Non-life    Life  Non-life     Life
  1997 1999  
 
Source: OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook (2001), own calculations. 
One important aspect has not been mentioned so far. The three types of entering a market 
from abroad (majority stake or take over, branches/agencies, direct sales without physical 
presence) differ in their potential to break up the structures of the once strongly nationally 
segmented insurance industry. That is to say that it makes a difference whether a foreign 
company acquires a domestic company or whether it decides to set up a new establishment or 
to do direct cross-border business. For the last two cases the decision is mostly combined with 
                                                 
16 In a similar study focusing on Germany Farny (2002) elaborates an even higher market share of foreign 
insurers for 1999 while using firm specific micro data instead of aggregated OECD data. 
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new insurance products being offered in the respective countries. Thus, new products have to 
compete with existing national products. In contrast, the sole change of ownership structures 
does not necessarily change the diversity of products. An acquirer simply buys the knowledge 
of local peculiarities. Consequently, benefits for the informed customer are more likely to be 
reached if the entering company builds up new establishments or enters the market for 
instance through the internet.17 
The results on the limited integration of EU insurance markets also hints at the relevance of 
obstacles to cross-border sales of insurance products. The fact that M&A strategies are 
dominant can also be interpreted in this way: A merger with a foreign insurance company has 
the crucial advantage to acquire the necessary know-how about national conditions. Thus, a 
large extent of regulatory and other national peculiarities should favour M&A relative to 
greenfield investments. Furthermore, the fact of lower integration of life compared to non-life 
insurance markets suggests that obstacles to integration are particularly severe for life 
insurance.18 Therefore, in the next section it is tried to explain these findings by looking at 
potential obstacles. 
4. Remaining fragmentation and policy priorities 
Although it has been verified in the previous section that the degree of integration in the 
European insurance industry is growing it is remarkable that the volume of insurance 
premiums written by national or local enterprises that are not a part of an insurance group 
operating on a pan-European scale still amounts to 55%.19 Even though no benchmark exists 
for an optimal degree of openness the European insurance market for private risks is still 
segmented. Furthermore, it has been shown in section 3 that the life and non-life sectors differ 
in their degree of openness so that one could suppose barriers being more important with 
respect to life insurance. This section therefore presents major obstacles to a truly integrated 
EU insurance market. 
In general, obstacles can be grouped into policy induced obstacles and natural obstacles. 
While it is illusory that natural obstacles will disappear in the medium term and at best fade 
out in the very long term policy induced obstacles can be diminished by policy action already 
in the short to medium term. In table 7 the most relevant obstacles relating to the integration 
of the single European insurance market are displayed.20 
                                                 
17 The latter point is touched upon in the last section when assessing the impact of e-insurance on insurance 
market integration. 
18 Since the OECD data set regrettably does not facilitate splitting up the non-life sector into industrial insurance 
(wholesale business) and the insurance of individual consumers (retail business) the analysed patterns of the 
non-life sector, especially with respect to the branches/agencies figures, include a combination of an 
internationalised industrial fraction and a hardly pan-European fraction. 
19 See Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (2001), p. 49. 
20 A questionnaire directed to leading EU insurance companies delivered important insights into this topic. See 
the box on page 19 for details. 
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Table 7: Obstacles to the integration of the single European market for insurance  
Policy induced obstacles Natural obstacles 
 Tax treatment of insurance 
 Regulation and supervision 
(incl. consumer protection/general good) 
 Contract law 
 Marketing rules (distance selling) 
 Accounting rules 
 Consumer preferences (“all business is 
local”): language, culture, loyalty 
 Information asymmetries 
 Legal system and tax system in general 
 Conventions, e.g. the renewal of contracts  
 
Source: Own analysis that based primarily on the ZEW survey 2001 (see box on the next page). 
Natural obstacles 
Since insurance is essentially based on trust, i.e. the customers confidence in the ability of the 
insurer to honour its obligations, the average consumer is extremely risk averse. Preferences 
thus are highly biased towards local structures and established channels of distribution.21 The 
more complex an insurance product the lower is the willingness of a customer to sign a 
contract with an unknown foreign supplier or even without “handshake”. According to the 
ZEW questionnaire (see next page) global players in the European insurance market regard 
consumer interest in buying products on a cross-border scale as extremely small. Only 
corporate clients are reported to buy their insurance coverage internationally from one of only 
a few global insurance companies. Additionally, consumer loyalty to domestic companies, 
language and other cultural differences are regarded as highly relevant barriers. 
On the other side of the market suppliers miss a reliable information basis. Problems that are 
relevant for every single insurance contract such as information asymmetries are reinforced 
with a growing spatial and cultural distance between the insurer and the customer. The legal 
and tax systems in general are yet additional obstacles that hinder the evolution of a level 
playing field for the insurance industry. The ZEW survey, though, indicates that some market 
participants consider solutions to these problems as illusionary. 
Conventions regarding the terms of insurance contracts also have an influence on the 
readiness of policyholders to switch to a rival product, let alone if produced from abroad. 
Price sensitive behaviour, for instance, is favoured in the UK where customers must actively 
take steps to renew their policies each year. In continental Europe on the contrary the renewal 
of contracts for the most part is automatic unless a contract is cancelled one to three months 
ahead.22 
                                                 
21 This assessment of course does not hold for the insurance of industrial risks and reinsurance. 
22 See John Kirwan (2000). 
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Policy induced obstacles 
Taxation 
The responsibility for tax policy mainly lies with 
the EU Member States. With respect to insurance 
one has to differentiate between the taxation of 
insurance companies and the taxation of an 
individual policy holder. Since taxation is not 
harmonised on an EU scale a diversity of both 
different tax rates and different taxation systems 
exist. 
In fact, the treatment of premiums paid by 
individuals varies widely among EU countries, e.g. 
by way of different rates for indirect taxes relevant 
for premiums. Determined in the Third Insurance 
Directives, these indirect taxes have to be paid to 
the host countries and EU Member States may even 
require that a fiscal representative of the insurance company is appointed in the country of the 
final consumer. The advantages of shopping across borders can be offset by the fact that the 
taxation regime remains that of the country where the consumer has his residence. The latter 
aspect has been pronounced by an insurance company in the questionnaire. 
Questionnaire 
A survey among a few leading players
in the European insurance market has
been conducted in September/October
2001 by the Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW, Mannheim
Germany). The questionnaire
contained questions regarding the
strategy of market access to other EU
markets and the relevance of specific
barriers to enter these markets. The
analysis in this section partially rests
upon information given in the
questionnaire. 
Since life insurance products to a significant extent resemble interest-bearing instruments 
issued by banks the uneven taxation of interests adds to the diversity. Also regarding to the 
taxation of insurance companies a variety of ways in which countries tax insurance business, 
particularly life insurance, are usual.23 In 2000, for example, there has been a variation in the 
income tax rate running from 28% in Ireland and Finland to 40.2% in Belgium. Furthermore, 
there are many different rules to the deductibility of certain insurance companies reserves 
(e.g. equalisation reserve and catastrophe reserve).24 In addition, to avoid double taxation in 
some EU/EEA countries (Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) there are 
differences in taxation treatment between domestic and foreign insurers.25 
This anecdotal evidence demonstrates that cross-border taxation issues obviously are costly in 
fields that show no EU harmonisation. Taxation issues therefore are of fundamental strategic 
importance for an insurance company to either build up offices or subsidiaries, alter their 
domicile or undertake direct cross-border business. The creation of the International Financial 
Services Centre (IFSC) in Dublin can be deemed as a logical outcome. The IFSC represents a 
dynamic place for the development and management of cross-border insurance products. 
                                                 
23 See OECD (2001b) for a detailed analysis of policyholder and insurance company taxation. 
24 See OECD (2001b), pp. 49ff. 
25 See OECD (1999), Liberalisation of International Insurance Operations, 1999, p. 83. 
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Between 1997 and 1999 cross-border life insurance business through companies domiciled in 
Ireland quadruplicated.26 Besides motives of mitigating the tax exposure for pan-EU insurers 
the IFSC is also used by several North American insurers to penetrate the European market 
acting from an Irish base.27  
Even more important than an opaque taxation regime, also discriminatory tax advantages only 
granted to specific groups have been widespread in the past. While tax competition in general 
is mostly regarded as desirable, unfair and discriminatory taxation certainly hampers 
integration. Discriminatory taxation has been present concerning tax deduction of life 
insurance premiums when deduction is limited to contracts that are effected with an insurer 
being authorised in the country of the policyholder. Even in 1999 ten EU/EEA countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal) granted fiscal advantages of that form.28 The European Commission in 1997 
commented on this problem: “Concerning life insurance products, differences between 
Member States' direct tax regimes have proved to be a substantial barrier to the development 
of cross-border activities. [...] The Commission is acting in this field in order to avoid that 
taxation remains an obstacle to the insurance Single Market.”29 It is instructive to observe that 
this internet notice has not been modified for four years. According to the Commission's 
notice the judgment of the Court of Justice has been in a way that permits this form of 
discriminatory tax deduction if it ensures consistency with the national tax regimes. 
The survey confirms the presumption made above since with regard to life insurance business 
pan-European competition is regarded “tentatively lower”. In this special case the market 
participant explained that assessment by the sluggish behaviour of clients keeping their close 
ties to their well-known intermediary. Certainly though, market transparency also suffers 
from the extremely diverse tax provisions, especially within the life insurance sector. 
Regulation, supervision and consumer protection 
Regulation and prudent supervision of insurance as an highly regulated business within the 
EU is subject to minimum harmonisation standards. National supervisory authorities therefore 
are capable of using their scope for discretion. The following aspects are the most relevant: 
(a) solvency of the undertaking (“solvency margin”), 
(b) establishment of technical provisions, 
(c) assets coverage of the technical provisions (e.g. currency matching rules).30 
                                                 
26 See Watson Wyatt (2001), Insurance and financial services review, August, and OECD (2001), Insurance 
Statistics Yearbook. 
27 See IMF (2001), Report on the observance of standards and codes – Ireland: II. Insurance Supervision and 
http://www.ifsc.ie. 
28 See OECD (1999), p. 40, 132-134. 
29 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/insur/87.htm#11. 
30 See Vollbrecht, (2001). 
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Similar to the fiscal arbitrage described above it could be a useful strategy to circumvent 
tough national provisions. An example for this behaviour can be found in Ireland where 
Italian insurers open up subsidiaries to circumvent the more stringent solvency margin 
requirements for life insurers set by the Italian regulatory authorities. These companies to a 
significant extent re-sell life insurance contracts cross-border to Italy.31 Compared to the 
problems arising by differing taxation treatment though, a country with a particular tight 
regulation hurts its own industry. This promotes a convergence in regulatory issues but has no 
discriminatory effect. 
Extensive consumer protection with respect to the general good principle is a basic problem 
for the retail markets. First, since consumer protection (under the general good principle) is 
based on the domicile of the consumer the companies have to adapt to the rules of 15 different 
countries. This means an immense barrier to market entry for SME insurers. Second, national 
authorities may use their discretionary scope for protectionist regulation. One has to weigh the 
value of consumer protection against an inferior supply with insurance services. Because 
there already exists a high level of consumer protection more harmonisation in this field is not 
premature for the benefit of the consumer. If the level of consumer protection was lowered 
this could be absorbed by models containing less distortions, e.g. the establishment of 
powerful pan-European ombudsman rules. The difficulty of credibly obtaining out of court 
redress is a barrier to the development of cross-border services, particularly in the financial 
sector since access to redress is vital to consumer confidence. The Commission puts it as 
follows: “Ultimately the consumer will always have access to the courts. But for cost reasons 
this is often a last resort. A realistic alternative has been established (FIN-NET) which 
provides effective and rapid out of court redress on a cross-border basis.“32 
Further policy induced obstacles were also mentioned as relevant in the ZEW survey: the lack 
of harmonisation of contract law, the freedom of the EU Member States to type and number 
compulsory classes of insurance, the missing global set of accounting rules. Another 
important barrier has not been identified as relevant. The immense costs for the transfer of 
small amounts within the EU payment systems certainly prevent retail customers from cross-
border deals.33 
Most policy induced obstacles to a truly Internal Market for insurance in the EU have been 
identified by EU representatives, in general by adopting the objectives of the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999.34 The FSAP addresses both wholesale and retail 
aspects. Also with respect to e-commerce most recently many relevant issues have been taken 
up by the „Report on e-commerce and financial services to the Financial Services Policy 
Group“ (August 2001). According to statements in the questionnaire policy action has the 
                                                 
31 See Watson Wyatt (2000). 
32 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/ecom.htm. 
33 See Schüler (2002). 
34 See Annex for details concerning the Financial Services Action Plan with relevance to insurance. 
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chief task to solve the legal domicile principle in the field of e-commerce. Furthermore, the 
political agreement about the Directive for the distance selling of financial services as an 
essential complement to the e-commerce Directive that will become effective in January 2002 
has been an important step. 
To complete the list of obstacles one should bear in mind that the cross-border data base 
should be improved. This could be reached by enhancing the co-operation between public 
authorities in the field of collecting more standardised statistics or even by the centralisation 
towards a pan-European Financial Services Authority. If no progress occurs in this field every 
assessment of insurance market integration remains incomplete. 
5. Concluding remarks 
„E-commerce may revolutionise the provision of financial services, especially cross-border 
within the Internal Market.“ (European Commission, 2001) 35 
A large scale project like that of the single market in insurance needs plenty of time. Actors of 
Member States and the EU institutions have to identify and remove problems and to agree in 
practical terms on how to apply the new legislation. Although the data base is far from perfect 
the analysis allows some general conclusions. 
Three generations of Insurance Directives have formally set up the freedoms of establishment 
and the free movement of services. Of course, countries sustained their national peculiarities 
in several spheres hence impeding the expansion of cross-border sales. The analysis of the 
degree of openness and patterns of market entry in European insurance leads to strong 
differences among countries and among classes of insurance that partly can be explained by 
the obstacles to a truly single market. 
On the supply side, there are obstacles emanating from different national rules (taxation, 
regulation, contract law, consumer protection). Though only to a slight extent discriminatory, 
these obstacles are costly and directly hinder cross-border transactions. On the demand side, 
customers, especially private consumers, are not as price sensitive concerning the purchase of 
a life insurance contract compared to the purchase of a refrigerator, for example. To a 
significant extent this is natural in the light of the complexity of many financial products and 
their characteristic as a good necessitating a large degree of long term confidence in the 
suppliers financial strength. Together, supply and demand sided circumstances can to a 
certain extent be made responsible for the outlined patterns of European cross-border 
integration. The above analysis suggests that in spite of large cross-border linkages through a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions the current degree of openness is insufficient, especially for 
the insurance of private (mass) risks. Admittedly, it should not be expected that the latter 
business possibly will catch up with the degree of integration in the reinsurance and industrial 
insurance business. 
                                                 
35 See European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ en/finances/consumer/ 01-1325.htm). 
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But at this point technological changes arising through the internet offer a big chance to offset 
certain obstacles since barriers to market entry are being reduced for smaller insurers, mainly 
by cost cutting in administration, distribution and claims management.36 Today, cross-border 
activities in EU insurance are pursued by only a few international insurers or financial 
conglomerates. Only these have surmounted the critical mass to do pan-European business. 
The entry barriers are high for tax reasons besides information asymmetries, consumer 
protection rules (general good) and consumer preferences. It is costly to deal with a plenty of 
differing tax and regulation regimes and other national peculiarities. The new setting (e-
insurance as an additional or exclusive distribution channel, the Euro as single unit of 
account) shows up to have the chance for potential competitors with a lower financial size to 
enter the market. On the demand side, by using the internet not only the costs of a transaction 
decrease, but also pan-European price transparency is completed as soon as the Euro acquires 
the unit of account and the means of payment functions by January 2002. Thus overall 
efficiency might be improved. Actual transactions via the internet, though, are minimal 
amounting to merely 0.02% of total European premiums (0.2% in the USA).37 Nowadays, the 
e-channel joins the group of established distribution channels like direct sales, tied agents, 
brokers and bankassurers. The e-channel has to be seen with a great deal of attention since it 
is well suited to further the integration of the retail markets for insurance products. But it 
should not be expected that e-insurance proceeds quickly. The propensity to use the internet 
only slowly expands owing to demographic factors since elderly customers will change their 
established relationships in purchasing financial products to a far lesser extent than the 
internet generation. 
                                                 
36 See Swiss Re (2000b). 
37 See Swiss Re (2000b), p. 12. 
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Annex 
The tables in figure 4 provide extracts from the official EU documentation concerning 
progress on individual actions in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The tables show 
the current situation and provide the Commission’s assessment of the degree to which 
Community institutions and Member States have achieved the objectives set out in the Action 
Plan until January 2002. Our own assessment has been added in the last column. 
Figure 4: Selected issues of the Financial Services Action Plan: Focus insurance 
Legend x Action has successfully completed 
 + Progress has been achieved in meeting the targets set in the Action Plan 
 − No progress (not acute in this excerpt) 
 ** Own assessment: important for the integration of personal insurance 
Strategic Objective 2: Open and secure retail markets 
Action Initial FSAP optimal 
timeframe 
Present timeframe (*)  
Political agreement on proposal for a Directive 
on the Distance Marketing of Financial Services 
Adoption end 2000 Political agreement 
Oct 2000 
 
Adoption Jun 2002 
+ ** 
Interpretative Communication on the freedom to 
provide services and the general good in 
insurance 
Issue summer 1999 Issued Feb 2000 x  
Proposal for amendment of Insurance 
Intermediaries Directive 
Proposal mid 2000 
 
Adoption 2002 
Proposal Sep 2000 
 
Adoption Dec 2002 
+ ** 
Commission Communication on a single market 
for payments 
Issue summer 1999 Issued Jan 2000 x  
Commission Action Plan to prevent fraud and 
counterfeiting in payments systems 
Issue end 1999 Issued Feb 2001 x  
Commission Communication on an e-commerce 
policy for financial services 
Issue mid 2000 Issued Jan 2001 x  
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Strategic Objective 3: State of the art prudential rules and supervision 
Action Initial FSAP optimal 
timeframe 
Present timeframe (*)  
Adopt the proposed Directive on the 
Reorganisation and Winding-up of Insurance 
undertakings 
Adoption 2001 Adopted Mar 2001 x  
Adopt the proposal for an Electronic Money 
Directive 
Adoption 2000 Adopted Sep 2000 x  
Amend the solvency margin requirements in the 
Insurance Directive 
Proposal mid 2000 
 
Adoption 2003 
Proposal Oct 2000 
 
Adoption Jan 2002 
+  
Amendment of the Insurance Directives and the 
ISD to permit information exchange with third 
countries 
Proposal autumn 1999 
 
Adoption 2001 
Proposal Sep 2000 
 
Adopted Nov 2000 
x  
Adopting a Directive on Prudential Rules for 
Financial Conglomerates 
Proposal end 2000 
 
Adoption 2002 
Proposal Apr 2001 
 
Adoption Dec 2002 
+  
Objective: Wider conditions for an optimal single financial market 
Action Initial FSAP optimal 
timeframe 
Present timeframe (*)  
Adopt a Directive for ensuring taxation of 
interest income from cross-border investment of 
savings 
Political agreement by 
Nov 1999 
 
Adoption 2000 
New Proposal Jul 
2001 
 
Adoption Dec 2002 
+ ** 
Implementation of the December 1997 Code of 
Conduct on business taxation 
Ongoing examination 
in the Code of 
Conduct Group 
Ongoing 
examination in the 
Code of Conduct 
Group 
+ ** 
Review of taxation of financial service products  Discussion in 
Taxation Policy 
Group 
 x ** 
Source: European Commission, extracted from the Commissions web-site 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/actionplan/index.htm) on January, 20, 2002, own 
additions. 
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